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AN ATTEMPT TO LEGISLATE MORALITY: FORCED
ULTRASOUNDS AS THE NEWEST TACTIC IN ANTIABORTION LEGISLATION

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the United States Supreme Court seemingly becomes more conservative, states
are beginning to enact legislation to test the boundaries of the Court's stance on abortion
rights.] In April of 2008, the Oklahoma legislature passed Senate Bill 1878, which
required, in part: (i) an ultrasound prior to any abortion performed in the state of
Oklahoma; and (ii) that the method of ultrasound, whether with a vaginal or an
abdominal transducer, be determined by whichever method would depict the fetus more
clearly.2 While a few other states require a physician to perform an ultrasound prior to an
abortion, Oklahoma's legislation is the first and only law that compels a physician to turn
the monitor toward the woman while performing the ultrasound and to describe the
images on the screen.3
On October 9, 2008, the Center for Reproductive Rights filed a lawsuit in the
District Court of Oklahoma County seeking injunctive relief and claiming a
constitutional right to privacy. Oklahoma District Court Judge Vicki L. Robertson
issued a declaratory judgment against Senate Bill 1878 on August 17, 2009, ruling that
the law violated a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution that requires legislation to
concern a single subject. 5 The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed Judge Robertson's
decision on March 1, 2010.6 The Oklahoma House of Representatives, however, has
proposed and overwhelmingly passed House Bill 2780, which is nearly identical to the
ultrasound requirement in Senate Bill 1878.7 This law should be deemed unconstitutional
1. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, ConstitutionalizingRoe, Casey and Carhart: A Legislative Due-Process AntiDiscrimination Principle that Gives Constitutional Content to the "Undue Burden" Standard of Review
Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 211, 243 (2001).
The legislative agenda set by the self-described "redemptive constitutionalists"
effectively promotes a program of pretextual legislation whose principal goal is to goad
the Supreme Court into continually re-considering Roe's recognition of a woman's rights
to chose [sic] and to reproductive autonomy until, one day, the Court might abrogate
those rights.
Id. at 243-244.
2. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b.
3. Ron Jenkins, Oklahoma Sued over New Abortion Ultrasound Law, http://www.sfgate.com /cgibin/article.cgi?fr/c/a/2008/10/l l/MN4013FO9F.DTL (accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
4. Nova Health Sys. v. Brad Henry, No. CJ-2008-9119 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 9, 2008); Ron
Jenkins, supra n. 3.
5. Nova Health Sys., No. CJ-2008-9119 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. Aug. 17, 2009).
6. Disposition Or. (Mar. 1, 2010) (available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdfloklasupetruling.pdf).
7. News Channel 8, House Passes Abortion Bill, http://www.ktul.com/news/stories/0310/ 711780.html
(accessed Mar. 16, 2010).
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because it is an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion.8 Furthermore, it
violates a competent pregnant woman's right to refuse medical treatment, and this right
outweighs the state's interest in protecting the potential life of a fetus.9
Part II of this paper focuses on the pertinent abortion cases expanding the right to
privacy to encompass a woman's right to obtain an abortion. 10 This section explains how
the United States Supreme Court initially examined a woman's right to an abortion under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and how, as the years progressed, the
Supreme Court allowed various restrictions on that right.II Next, the section explains the
undue burden standard-the current standard courts must use in determining whether a
restriction on a woman's right to an abortion is constitutional.12
Part III describes the ultrasound requirement and its effects on women and their
doctors. 13 This section discusses the legislative history regarding how the provision
came into effect, and explains the legislative intent. Part III(A) applies the undue burden
standard to the ultrasound requirement.14 This section also examines the inadequacies of
the legislative purposes of the ultrasound requirement-namely, informed consent and the
promotion of psychological well-being. Part III(B) describes a person's right to refuse
medical care. The section contains relevant cases in which the Supreme Court first found
a right to refuse medical care and then explicitly referred to a competent person's right to
refuse medical care.15 The section explains that the right to refuse medical care is not
absolute. Furthermore, this section describes the Youngberg balancing test and explains
how it determines whether a restriction violates a person's right to refuse medical care.16
The section then describes the four general exceptions to a person's right to refuse
medical care, and how the relevant exceptions should not apply to the ultrasound
requirement. 17 Finally, the section applies the Youngberg balancing test to weigh the
state's interest against the interest of a woman refusing medical care-specifically, an
ultrasound prior to an abortion.18 The comment concludes in Part IV that the ultrasound
requirement should be found unconstitutional because it violates a woman's right to an
abortion without a substantial obstacle and a woman's right to refuse medical treatment.

8. PlannedParenthoodofS.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
9. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982) (explaining that to determine whether a person's constitutional rights have been violated, a balancing
test must be done weighing "his liberty interests against relevant state interests").
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Id.; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
12. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
13. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b.
14. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
15. See e.g. Wash. v. Harper,494 U.S. 210, 221-222 (1990); Cruzan, 497 U.S.at 278.
16. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.
17. In re GuardianshipofBrowning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990).
18. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.
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HISTORY OF RELEVANT ABORTION LEGISLATION

Roe v. Wade

In Roe v. Wade, 19 the United States Supreme Court held that a woman had a
Constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy under the right to privacy within the
liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 The Court in Roe held that a pregnant
woman's right to an abortion was a fundamental right and that violations of that right
were subject to the strict scrutiny test.21 To survive a strict scrutiny assessment, the
burden is on the state to prove that the statute serves a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest. 22 While the Court specifically
held that a woman does not have an absolute right to privacy,23 during the first trimester
at least, the decision of whether to obtain an abortion rested solely with the pregnant
woman and her doctor.24 During the first trimester, the State could make no regulations
restricting abortions because the State's interest of "protecting the potentiality of human
life,25 was not yet "compelling," 2 6 as the fetus, during the first trimester, would never be
able to sustain independent life outside the mother's womb. 27
The Roe Court based the trimester distinction on the concept of viability. 2 8 Doctors
have determined that the point of fetal viability is approximately 28 weeks, or possibly
less, at which point a fetus would be able to live outside the mother's womb with
medical aid. 29 During the second trimester, states could regulate abortions in such a
manner that would protect a mother's health. 30 After viability, states were allowed to
regulate, or even ban, a woman's right to an abortion-with exceptions for the
preservation of the mother's health and life-because a state's interest in protecting
human life became compelling. 3 1
B.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey

With the resignation of two liberal Supreme Court Justices, Justices Marshall and
Brennan, and the appointment of Justice Thomas, many believed the Supreme Court
would overturn Roe v. Wade.32 However, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
19. Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
20. Id. at 153.
21. Id at 155.
22. See e.g. Regents of U of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978); Lange-Kessler v. Dept. of Educ. of
the St. of N.Y, 109 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1997); Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F. Supp. 1135, 1141
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
24. Id. at 163.
25. Id. at 162.
26. Id. at 163.
27. Id
28. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 163.
31. Id. at163-165.
32. Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw 867 (2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2005).
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Pennsylvania v. Casey,33 the Court upheld the premise in Roe that a woman had the right
to an abortion prior to fetus viability.34 In Casey, Planned Parenthood challenged a
Pennsylvania statute because it placed restrictions on pre-viability abortions. 35 The
provisions of the statute required a physician to give a woman seeking an abortion
information that advocated childbirth over abortion in order to obtain informed consent
and to wait at least twenty-four hours after the information was given before an abortion
was performed. The statute further required physicians to obtain parental consent for
minors seeking an abortion, to ensure a married woman notified her husband of her
decision to obtain an abortion, and to record specific information regarding every
abortion. 36
While the Casey Court ultimately upheld the major premise in Roe that a woman
had the right to obtain an abortion, the Court rejected certain themes of Roe and added
various restrictions to a woman's right to obtain an abortion. 3 7 Casey effectively did
away with Roe's strict scrutiny standard of review regarding a state's interest prior to
viability.38 While the Court in Roe held that states could regulate abortions only in
certain trimesters, the Court in Casey rejected the "rigid"39 trimester framework and
modified the concept of viability established in Roe. 40 Finally, the Casey Court rejected
Roe's decision that a state could not implement regulations prior to viability, holding that
states may enact regulations to ensure that a woman's decision is "thoughtful and
informed."4 1 The Court adopted the undue burden standard, under which a pre-viability
state regulation on abortion would be upheld if it did not "ha[ve] the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion . .,42 Along
with the new undue burden standard, the Casey Court also placed the burden of proving
the new standard on those challenging the law rather than on the government, as required
by Roe.43 While the Court in Casey created this new undue burden standard, it did not
explain how to use the standard-other than the "substantial obstacle" 44 language-leaving
45
many uncertainties for lower courts to decide.
The Court held that the provision in the Pennsylvania law requiring a woman to
notify her husband of her intention to obtain an abortion was an undue burden and,
therefore, unconstitutional. 46 The Court reasoned that this provision would "not merely
make abortions a little more difficult" 4 7 for a small number of women; the provision
33. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
34. Caroline Burnett, Student Author, Dismantling Roe Brick by Brick-The Unconstitutional Purpose
Behind the FederalPartial-BirthAbortion Act of 2003, 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 227, 238 (2007).
35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
36. Id.
37. Burnett, supran. 34, at 238.
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 840.
39. Id. at 872.
40. Id. at 870.
41. Id at 872.
42. Id. at 877.
43. Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash ofAbsolutes 247 (2d ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1992).
44. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
45. Van Detta, supran. 1, at 213.
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-894.
47. Id. at 893.
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would likely prevent that group of women-namely, those in domestic violence
situations-from obtaining an abortion, thus preventing their right to choose. 4 8 The Casey
Court upheld the provision requiring an unemancipated girl, under eighteen-years-old, to
have a parent or guardian's consent prior to any abortion. 4 9 The Court reasoned that
because the statute contained a judicial-bypass provision permitting a girl to petition the
court to allow her to give her own informed consent, it did not create a substantial
obstacle to obtaining an abortion. 5 0
The Court also upheld the statute's recordkeeping and reporting provisions that
required physicians to file reports containing each woman's abortion facts and
information concerning the physician performing the abortion. 5 1 The information
required to be recorded included the type of abortion procedure, date of abortion, number
of prior abortions, etc.52 The Court reasoned that recording this type of information
serves a purpose "other than to make abortions more difficult" 53 because the records of
abortions were imperative for medical research. 54
Similarly, the Court applied the undue burden analysis on the provisions for
informed consent and a mandatory waiting period in the same Pennsylvania law. The
Court found the provisions to be constitutional, as they were not an undue burden on a
woman's right to choose. 55 These provisions required a physician to wait twenty-four
hours before performing an abortion and to provide the woman with information
regarding the procedure itself.56 The physician was required to inform the woman of the
risks of an abortion and information about the fetus. 57 The woman also had to certify that
the physician or qualified abortion provider had informed her of her right to view stateoffered material regarding alternatives to abortion. 5 8 The Court held that if a state
"enact[s] legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when
in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion," 59 it would not
be an undue burden, as the state would be merely promoting its interest in potential
life.60 Applying the undue burden analysis to the Pennsylvania statute, the Casey Court
held that even though a provision affected the cost or made it more difficult to obtain an
abortion, it did not necessarily create an undue burden. 61 However, at some point, an
increased cost could create an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion and a
court could use an increased cost in its undue burden analysis. 62
In support of its decision to uphold the informed consent and mandatory waiting
48. Id. at 893-894.
49. Id. at 899.

50. Id
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 900.
Id.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 900-901.
Id. at 881.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.

57. Id.
58. Id
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 883.
Id.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
Id. at 901.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 45 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 7
TULSA LAW REVIEW

364

Vol. 45:359

period provisions, the Court added that the statute allowed a physician to use his or her
judgment to determine whether to withhold the information if it would cause a serious
physical or emotional strain on the woman.63 While the Casey Court determined that the
informed consent and mandatory waiting period provisions were not undue burdens,
Professor Tribe suggests the Court was "hypertechnical" in its decision.M Because the
undue burden standard had not yet become the standard of review for abortion
regulations, the District Court determined the waiting period provision to be "particularly
burdensome."65 The Supreme Court in Casey determined that "particularly burdensome"
did not qualify as unduly burdensome and upheld the provision. 6 6
Effectively, the Court in Casey, while rejecting various tenets of Roe, upheld the
general concept that women have the right to choose whether to have an abortion.67 The
Casey Court also upheld the general standard in Roe that "ensure[s] that the woman's
right to choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal life
that her choice exists in theory but not in fact."6 8 Nevertheless, the Court held that states
do have an interest in the fetus a woman is carrying, as it is potential life. The Court
further held that states might regulate pre-viability abortions as long as the restriction's
purpose or effect did not place a substantial obstacle before a woman's right to choose an
abortion.69
III.

OKLAHOMA STATUTES TITLE 63, SECTION 1-738.31

Section 1-738.3b, which became effective on November 1, 2008 requires, in
pertinent part:
B. In order for the woman to make an informed decision, at least one (1) hour prior to a
woman having any part of an abortion performed or induced ... the physician who is to
perform or induce the abortion . .. shall:

1. Perform an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant woman, using either a vaginal
transducer or an abdominal transducer, whichever would display the embryo or fetus more
clearly;
2. Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting;
3. Display the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them;
4. Provide a medical description of the ultrasound images, which shall include the
dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardiac activity ... and the presence of

external members and internal organs ....
C. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman from averting
her eyes from the ultrasound images required to be provided to and reviewed with
her ...

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

70

Id. at 883-884.
Tribe, supra n. 43, at 249.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 886.
Id. at 886-887; Tribe, supra n. 43, at 249.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 877.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b.
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Senator Todd Lamb introduced Senate Bill 1878 on February 4, 2008.71 The bill
passed the Senate and was introduced into the House of Representatives on March 12,
2008, where it passed and was signed by both the Senate and the House.72 Congress sent
the bill to Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry on April 10, 2008. The Governor then vetoed
it on April 16, 2008.73 Governor Henry, in his veto memorandum, explained that the bill
did not contain an exemption for women who were victims of rape or incest from the
forced ultrasound and that requiring these victims to submit to an ultrasound would
essentially allow the state to "victimize[ ] the victim for a second time." 74
The Oklahoma Legislature effectively overrode the Governor's veto on April 17,
2008 with a 37-11 vote in the Senate and an 81-15 vote in the House. 7 5 In a Senate News
Release on April 17, 2008, Senator Lamb explained that he believed the Governor's veto
memorandum was inaccurate because those victims would not be "force[d] . . . to view

an ultrasound of their unborn baby."76 Senator Lamb was referring to a provision of
Senate Bill 1878 that allows a woman to avert her eyes during the ultrasound; however,
victims of rape and incest are still required to comply with the overall ultrasound
procedure. 77
In a telephone interview with Senator Lamb, he explained that the purpose of the
ultrasound requirement was to reduce the number of abortions by requiring
ultrasounds. He contended that an ultrasound would allow a doctor to disclose fully the
information regarding the woman's pregnancy and the development of her unborn child,
which would allow the woman to give her informed consent prior to obtaining an
abortion. 79 Senator Lamb explained that the requirement that a woman have an
ultrasound prior to an abortion might also aid the mental health of mothers contemplating
an abortion, preventing them from later regretting the taking of a human life.80
Prior to the passage of the ultrasound requirement, Oklahoma already had an
informed consent statute regarding ultrasounds and abortions. This Act, appropriately
called "Voluntary and Informed Consent-Compliance by Physicians-Confirmation of
Receipt of Medical Risk Information," requires a physician, or a physician's agent, to
provide a woman seeking an abortion with certain information to ensure informed

71. Okla. Sen. 1878 History, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. § 12 (2008) (available in Westlaw, OK-LH database).
72. Id
73. Id.
Message,
http://www.ok.gov/govemor/billtrack/
Bill
Veto
Brad
Henry,
74. Gov.
index.php?veto=2591&year=2008 (last accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
75. Oklahoma Senate, Senate Press Release, "State Legislature Overrides Henry Veto of Bipartisan Pro80
http://oksenate.gov/news/press-releases/pressreleases 2008/pr200 417b.html (last
Life Legislation,"
accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
76. Id (emphasis added).
77. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b.
78. Telephone Interview with Todd Lamb, Okla. Sen. (Sept. 19, 2008) (notes on file with Author); see also
Guttmacher Inst., State Policies in Brief Requirements for Ultrasounds, http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spibRFU.pdf (last accessed Mar. 17, 2010) [hereinafter State Policies in Brie] (indicating
that laws that require ultrasounds prior to abortions are "a veiled attempt to personify the fetus and dissuade a
woman from obtaining an abortion").
79. Id
80. Id.
81. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.2 (2006).
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consent. 82 This information includes the name of the physician performing the
abortion, the potential medical risks of an abortion, 84 the likely gestational age of the
fetus,85 the risks of carrying a fetus to term,86 and that an ultrasound is available to her,
including contact information for facilities that provide ultrasounds at no cost.8 7 In
addition, the Act requires doctors to give these women information regarding assistance
that they could receive if she carried her child to term, such as monetary support from
the child's biological father,89 assistance with medical costs relating to pregnancy and
childbirth, 90 and alternatives to abortion. 9 1 Therefore, Oklahoma already had a thorough
informed consent statute in effect prior to the passing of the ultrasound requirement.92
A.

Section 1-738.3b is an Undue Burden to a Woman's Right to an Abortion

The intention of Roe, reaffirmed by Casey, was to prevent the states from so
thoroughly restricting a woman's right to an abortion that the right to choose essentially
became nonexistent. 93 A state's abortion regulation that allegedly promotes its interest in
the possible life of a nonviable fetus that "hinder[s]" 94 rather than "inform[s] [a]
woman's free choice"95 would not be a constitutional regulation.96 The ultrasound
requirement does just that; it hinders a woman's right to free choice rather than
informing the woman about that right. 97
To determine whether a state regulation unduly burdens a woman's right to
choose, the courts must examine the facts on a case-by-case basis.98 The Casey Court's
opinion made it very clear that the decisions the Court made regarding the individual
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute were based on the record before them, and were
not to be applied automatically to all similar state laws. 99 In determining whether the
recordkeeping provision in the Pennsylvania statute was an undue burden, the Court in
Casey noted that keeping records of abortions is essential to medical research.100 This
led the Court to conclude that the provision "cannot be said [to] . . . serve no purpose

82. Id.
83. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)(1).
84. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)(2).
85. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)(3).
86. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)(4).
87. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(1)(a)(5).
88. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(2).
89. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(2)(b).
90. Id. at § 1-738.2(B)(2)(a).
91. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.2(B)(2)(c)(3).
92. Id. at § 1-738.2.
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
94. Id. at 877.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (explaining that the District Court found mandatory waiting periods to be
"particularly burdensome," but did so under Roe's trimester framework and did not deduce that the waiting
period would create a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose an abortion).
99. Id. at 887 (explaining that "on the record before us, and in the context of this facial challenge . .
(emphasis added); Tribe, supra n. 43, at 249.
100. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900-901.
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other than to make abortions more difficult." 10 1 Because the decision in Casey was so
fact-based, this language would seem to suggest that a regulation, which had the sole
purpose of making abortions more difficult to obtain, would be constitutionally
questionable.1 02 In the application of the undue burden standard, a court must examine
whether the proposed regulation "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion . . . ."103 The "purpose" 1 04 prong of
05
the undue burden test allows for a facial challenge of the statute, while the "effect[s]"
106
prong allows for an as-applied challenge.
While the ultrasound requirement masquerades as a statute whose purpose
arguably provides for a woman's informed consent prior to an abortion, it requires that a
woman undergo a potentially invasivel 07 medical procedure before she may exercise her
constitutional right to obtain an abortion in the state of Oklahoma.108 While the
legislators argue that an ultrasound will allow a woman to understand fully the
ramifications of an abortion-that abortion kills a potential human being-there is no
informed consent for the ultrasound procedure itself. 109 Under the Oklahoma Voluntary
and Informed Consent Act, a woman seeking an abortion is given information regarding
an optional ultrasound prior to her abortion, but is not required to have the ultrasound
performed. 110 The ultrasound requirement does not allow a woman to opt out of the
ultrasound.111 Nor does the provision allow a physician to use his or her discretion. 112if
the physician does use his or her discretion and decides not to perform the ultrasound, he
or she will be subject to a fine between $10,000 and $100,000,113 with an exception for a
medical emergency.114
Informed consent pertaining to abortion regulations is very different from informed
consent for less morally controversial medical procedures.11 5 Because courts have
upheld various informed consent laws as being legitimate and constitutional, legislators
have used the concept of informed consent to disguise otherwise constitutionally

101. Id. at 901.
102. Linda J. Wharton, Susan Frietsche & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18 Yale J.L. & Feminism 317, 377 (2006).
103. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Wharton et al., supran. 102, at 377.
107. "Potentially invasive" refers to the manner in which the ultrasound is performed. While an abdominal
ultrasound may not be physically invasive, a vaginal ultrasound (as required in Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § I738.3b(B)(1)) could be considered physically invasive.
108. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b; see also Rachel Benson Gold, All That's Old is New Again: The Long
Campaign to Persuade Women to Forego Abortion, 12 Guttmacher Policy Rev. 19, 21 (2009) (available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/2/gprl202l9.pdf ) (explaining that legislation that attempts to dissuade
women from obtaining an abortion is "a perversion of medical ethics in general and the informed consent
process in particular").
109. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
110. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.2.
Ill. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b(B).
112. Id.
113. Id. at § 1-738.3c(C).
114. Id. at § 1-738.3b(D).
115. Van Detta, supra n. 1, at 257 (explaining how the health care industry has largely been allowed to
create its own rules regarding informed consent for most medical procedures).
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questionable abortion regulations.116 In general, medical professional standards and
ethics rather than state legislators determine the measures needed for informed consent
for most medical procedures. 1 17 However, courts have consistently allowed the
legislature-traditionally comprised of non-physicians-to determine the scope of
informed consent for abortion laws. 118 Effectively, the legislature "singl[es] out"11 9
abortion procedures and subjects them to regulations unheard of for other medical
procedures. 120
These laws, disguised as informed consent, are created to " 'morally Mirandize'
the woman in an effort to arouse in her feelings of sin, guilt and shame, as well as
unrealistic portraiture of how much easier life as a (frequently single) mother can be." 1 2 1
Under the guise of informed consent, the courts have allowed the legislature to regulate
abortion through government-approved psychological coercion.122 Rather than
explaining the medical risks involved in the abortion procedure, physicians in the case of
the ultrasound requirement are forced to show the woman an ultrasound image of the
fetus while describing its physical and anatomical characteristics.123 That is not
informed consent for a medical procedure; it is informed consent for purposes of
encouraging a statutorily required moral standard. 12 4
In Casey, the majority reasoned that, "as with any medical procedure, the State
may require a woman to give her written informed consent to an abortion." 25An
ultrasound is a medical procedure, and yet the Oklahoma state legislature requires a
physician to perform an ultrasound on a pregnant woman seeking an abortion even if the
woman adamantly refuses to consent. 126 Furthermore, Oklahoma already has a very
detailed and comprehensive informed consent statute.127 Because the ultrasound
requirement renders valueless a woman's informed consent regarding whether or not to
have an ultrasound after given the option to have one, § 1-738.3b's purpose could not
possibly be one of informed consent.1 28
An ultrasound prior to every abortion is a medically unnecessary test.129 Doctors
typically use ultrasounds to determine the gestational age of the fetus and to recognize
any potential pregnancy problems.130 Dr. Dana Stone, OB-GYN, explained that a
116. Id. at258-259.
117. Id. at 257.
118. Id. at 246.
119. Id.
120. Van Detta, supra n. 1, at 246.
121. Id. at 259.
122. Id. at 234.
123. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b(B)(3)-(4).
124. Van Detta, supra n. 1, at 234.
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
126. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b(A) (stating "[a]ny abortion provider who knowingly performs an abortion
shall comply with the requirements in this section" (emphasis added)).
127. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.2.
128. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b.
129. Telephone Interview with Dana Stone, OB-GYN (Oct. 3, 2008) (notes on file with Author); Jack M.
Valpey, Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health 2, http://www.prch.org/files/37_valpey.pdf (last
accessed Mar. 17, 2010); State Policies in Brief supra n. 78.
130. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129 (explaining that some problems such as ectopic pregnancies
and certain gynecological problems can be found using an ultrasound).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/7

10

Weber: An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newes
2009

ANATTEMPT TO LEGISLATE MORALITY

369

capable physician, in most cases, would be able to determine the required information to
perform an abortion by doing a pelvic exam and that no ultrasound would be
necessary. 13 1 Prior to the ultrasound requirement, if a physician, using his or her medical
judgment, determined that an ultrasound was necessary prior to an abortion, the situation
would be explained to the patient, consent would be given, and an ultrasound would be
performed.1 32 The ultrasound requirement does not allow a physician to use his or her
medical expertise and judgment to determine whether an ultrasound is necessary. 133
Senator Lamb explained that the ultrasound requirement would also promote a
woman's mental health by allowing her to see her unborn child. 134 He described the
mental torment that some women go through after aborting their child.13 5 The ultrasound
requirement seems to disregard the mental health of the women who are required to have
an ultrasound, without their consent, and who proceed with the abortion.136 A woman
who views the ultrasound images and listens to her physician explain that the fetus has a
heartbeat, limbs, and is approximately x weeks of age, may begin to regard the fetus as a
baby. 13 7 However, because of various factors, the woman proceeds with the abortion. 138
In this scenario, it is probable that a woman viewing the fetus as a "baby" would
experience more psychological harm after the abortion than if she had not viewed the
ultrasound. 139
Finally, the ultrasound requirement appears to disregard the psychological harm to
a woman who, after viewing the ultrasound and adopting the view that the fetus is her
baby, refuses the abortion.140 After viewing the ultrasound, a woman, while in a
heightened emotional state, might choose to carry the fetus to term and raise the child. 141

131. Id.; see also State Policies in Brief supra n. 78 (indicating that "routine ultrasound[s] [are] not
considered medically necessary as a component of first-trimester abortion[s]").
132. Telephone Interview, Stone, supran. 129.
133. Id; Valpey, supra n. 129, at 2 (arguing that laws that require ultrasounds prior to every abortion "allow
non-physicians to dictate medical practice").
134. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
135. Nick Hopkins, Steve Reicher & Jannat Saleem, Constructing Women's PsychologicalHealth in AntiAbortion Rhetoric, 44 Sociological Rev. 539, 544 (Aug. 1996) (explaining how anti-abortion psychologists
have created a disorder called Post-Abortion Syndrome that has similar side-effects of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder including flashbacks, nightmares, and uncontrollable grief); see also Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and
Mental Health: Myths and Realities, 9 Guttmacher Policy Rev. 8, 8 (2006) (available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/3/gpr090308.pdf) (explaining that the post-abortion syndrome that
antiabortion activists argue is so prevalent is not recognized by the American Psychological Association or the
American Psychiatric Association).
136. Hopkins et al., supra n. 135, at 549 (explaining that the rhetorical language used by individuals in the
context of abortion makes a difference; for example, a woman feeling extraordinary grief after an abortion is
likely evidence that she "construct[ed] the foetus as a person").
137. Id. at 553 ("they will hear the baby's heart beating, then they know it's a baby, then they think
differently" (emphasis deleted)).
138. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining "[m]atemity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future").
139. Hopkins et al., supran. 135, at 549.
140. Valpey, supra n. 129, at 2 (arguing that the only purpose of an ultrasound requirement "is to force
women to feel guilty for choosing a specific healthcare option").
141. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 184, n. 7 (2007) (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
[N]either the weight of the scientific evidence to date nor the observable reality of 33
years of legal abortion in the United States comports with the idea that having an abortion
is any more dangerous to a woman's long-term mental health than delivering and
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The majority in Roe recognized the psychological harm to a woman who has a child she
did not intend to have. 142 Forcing an ultrasound on a woman as a psychological weapon
to discourage her from having an abortion could lead to more psychological trauma.1 43
This psychological trauma on the woman who views the ultrasound and proceeds with
the abortion, or the woman who views the ultrasound and carries and raises the
unintended child, is a substantial obstacle in the path of their right to seek an abortion.144
While the Casey Court upheld mandatory waiting periods as giving a woman time
to reflect and make a thoughtful decision, the ultrasound requirement encourages just the
opposite. 145 An ultrasound at least one hour prior to an abortion could cause a woman to
be in a heightened emotional state while making the ultimate decision.146 Such an
emotional condition might cause some women to decide against the abortion when an
abortion would clearly be in their best interest. 147 Therefore, while the purpose of the
ultrasound requirement is claimed to be conducive to women's mental health and wellbeing,148 the provision actually facilitates psychological harm and rash, emotional
decisions. 149

In addition, the provision allows the legislature to make medical decisions
regarding the most private and intimate procedure a woman could have, effectively
taking the decision out of the hands of the woman and her physician.1 50 Because the
ultrasound provision has neither an informed consent purpose nor a medical purpose, the
only purpose remaining is to discourage women from having abortions.151 This purpose,
under the prevailing standard of Casey, would constitute an undue burden because it
"serve[s] no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult." 1 52
Because the regulation has been enacted, the effects prong of the undue burden
standard may be used to determine whether the additional cost of an ultrasound would
create an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion.153 The Casey Court

parenting a child that she did not intend to have ....
Id. (quoting Cohen, supran. 135, at 8).
142. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining that "[t]here is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it").
143. Cohen, supra n. 135, at 8 (arguing that research indicates that the psychological trauma of raising an
unintended child or placing an unintended child for adoption is greater than the psychological trauma of an
abortion); Valpey, supra n. 129, at 2 (arguing that laws requiring ultrasounds prior to abortions are "only
intended . . . to force women to feel guilty for choosing a specific healthcare option . .
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
145. Id. at 885.
146. Hopkins et al., supra n. 135, at 552-553 (explaining that ultrasounds may be used as a tool of "direct
experience" that changes a woman's perception from "foetus" to "baby").
147. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining the psychological and physical detriments of raising an unintended
child).
148. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
149. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Cohen, supran. 135 at 8.
150. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129; Sigrid Fry-Revere, When an UltrasoundBecomes Political,
http://www.cato.org/pub display.php?pub id=8248 (accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
151. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78 (explaining the purposes the ultrasound requirement are
informed consent and to discourage women from having abortions to secure a child's right to life).
152. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
153. Id. at 877.
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conceded that, "at some point," 1 54 state regulations that increase the cost of an abortion
could have the effect of creating a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to choose and
could be an undue burden. 15 5 In the United States, a first trimester abortion costs
approximately $350-$500. 156 In the state of Oklahoma, an ultrasound costs
approximately $200-$300 at an OB-GYN's office. 157 Using these figures, requiring an
ultrasound prior to a first trimester abortion would raise the cost of the abortion between
forty-seven percent and seventy percent. 158 While the Casey Court did not indicate at
what point an increase in the cost of an abortion becomes an undue burden, requiring
every woman seeking an abortion to pay approximately fifty percent more for a
medically unnecessary testl59 should be considered a substantial obstacle to a woman's
right to choose an abortion. 160
Senator Todd Lamb explained that the woman is not required to view the
ultrasound images.161 The statute includes a provision that allows the woman to "avert[ ]
her eyes from the ultrasound images"l62 during the procedure.163 Even so, the section
requires a doctor to describe the images on the screen orally.164 Logically, this would
force a woman who prefers not to consider the ultrasound images to avert or close her
eyes and cover her ears while the physician performs the ultrasound procedure.1 65 While
this is not only demeaning to the woman, who is reduced to covering her ears and eyes in
her physician's office, it also interferes with the integrity of the doctor-patient
relationship.166 This law does not allow a physician to tailor the information about the
abortion process given to his or her patient. 16 7 Instead, the law requires the physician to
force a medically unnecessary procedure on his or her patient, with or without her
consent, to facilitate the legislature's moral agenda.168

154. Id. at 901.
155. Id.
156. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129; National Abortion Federation, Economics of Abortion,
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs research/publications/downloads/aboutabortion/economics of abortion.pdf
(last accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
157. Telephone Interview, Stone, supran. 129.
158. Calculations were computed by dividing 200 by 425 (the average of $350 and $500), equaling 47.06%,
then dividing 300 by 425, and getting 70.59%.
159. Valpey, supran. 129, at 2.
160. Wharton et al., supra n. 102, at 363 (quoting Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion
Politics: Writingfor an Audience of One, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 136-137 (1989)).
It is not simply a matter of a man's perspective versus a woman's or, all too often, a
girl's. Unwanted pregnancies strike harder at the poor and the young than at comfortable
adults. Inadequate health care, incomplete birth control information, and violence and
abuse, are far more common realities for poor and young women than for middle class
adults. Moreover, while a $50 difference in cost may appear modest to most members of
the Supreme Court, whose families are insured in any event, it is a lifetime's savings for a
teenage girl. To forget her perspective could, quite literally, cost her life.
Id.
161. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
162. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b(C).
163. Id.
164. Id. at §§ 12(B)(2), (B)(4).
165. Id. at §§ 12(B)(2), (B)(4), (C).
166. Valpey, supra n. 129, at 1.
167. Id. at2.
168. Id. at 2.
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The ultrasound requirement is an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an
abortion. 169 Proponents of the forced ultrasounds argue that the purpose of the law is to
obtain informed consent, promote a woman's psychological well-being, and discourage
women from having abortions. 170 While informed consent and promoting psychological
well-being could be legitimate state interests, the ultrasound requirement could not
logically have either purpose. 171 This requirement shamelessly disregards consent to the
ultrasound-a medical procedure-by mandating an ultrasound prior to every abortion. 172
The provision also disregards the psychological harm that requiring an ultrasound might
induce. 173 Therefore, the only purpose remaining is to discourage women from obtaining
an abortion, which the Casey Court held would be an undue burden. 174 Finally, the
excessive increase in the cost of an abortion when an ultrasound is required should also
be considered an undue burden. 175 Because the ultrasound requirement is unquestionably
a substantial obstacle to a woman's ability to obtain an abortion, the provision should be
declared unconstitutional. 176
B.

Section 1-738.3b is a Violation of an Adult's Right to Refuse Medical Care

The United States Supreme Court has consistently found that a person has a right
to refuse medical care. 177 Traditionally, courts upheld this right through the common law
doctrines of battery, informed consent, and bodily integrity. 178 Following these
doctrines, Justice Cardozo, in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, found that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body .... 179 Although many courts relied on common law as the
basis for the right to refuse medical care, the Supreme Court has found a liberty right
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as a basis for the
right to refuse medical care.180

169. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
170. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
171. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-882 (explaining how the Court may uphold abortion regulations that promote
informed consent and psychological well-being); but see Cohen, supra n. 135, at 8-11 (arguing that the
psychological trauma of abortion is over exaggerated and based on inaccurate studies); Gold, supra n. 108, at
21 (arguing that state regulations that attempt to discourage women from obtaining an abortion are a
"perversion of. . . the informed consent process in particular").
172. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1738.3b(B).
173. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
174. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 877.
177. See e.g. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balancing an individual's liberty interest in
refusing a mandatory smallpox vaccination against the state's interest in public health and safety); Harper,494
U.S. at 221-222 (balancing an individual's liberty interest in refusing medication against the state's interest in
prison safety and security); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (providing that a competent person has the constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment).
178. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-270 (explaining the common law doctrines of battery and informed consent
justified the right to make one's own medical decisions).
179. 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914); see also Union P. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding
that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others").
180. See e.g. Harper,494 U.S. at 221-222; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
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In Youngberg v. Romeo, 18 1 the United States Supreme Court discussed the test
82
used to determine whether a person's liberty interest has been violated.1 The United
States Supreme Court has since used this test to determine whether a statute violates a
person's liberty interest in the right to refuse medical care. 183 In Youngberg, Romeo,
who suffered from severe mental retardation, was placed in the care of a Pennsylvania
institution when his mother was unable to care for him. 184 Because of Romeo's own
violence and the violence of the other residents, Romeo was injured over sixty-three
times during his time at the institution.185 His mother filed an initial complaint against
the institution, alleging that the facility knew Romeo was being injured and did nothing
to prevent the injuries. 186 After the initial complaint was filed, the facility admitted
Romeo to the infirmary for a broken arm. 187 During Romeo's stay in the infirmary, his
doctor ordered the staff to keep him in physical restraints for portions of each day.
Romeo's mother filed a second amended complaint alleging that the facility restrained
Romeo on a daily basis. 189 A jury returned a verdict in favor of the institution and the
190
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
institution had violated Romeo's liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.191 The
Youngberg Court held that Romeo had a liberty interest "in safety and freedom from
bodily restraint,"l92 but that the liberty right was not absolute.193 To determine if his
liberty right was violated, the Youngberg Court required a balancing test of " 'the liberty
of the individual' and 'the demands of an organized society.' "194 The Youngberg Court
ultimately vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case because
of an erroneous jury instruction at the trial. 195
In Washington v. Harper,196 the issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the state violated an inmate's Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it required the inmate to take antipsychotic medications
The HarperCourt reasoned that Harper had a liberty interest to refuse
against his will.
unwanted antipsychotic medication under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.198 However, because Harper was an inmate in a state correctional facility,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Id. at 320.
Youngberg standard used in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-280.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id
Id. at 310-311.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 319-320.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 325.
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
Id at 217.
Id at 221-222.
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his liberty interest had to be weighed against the interests of the correctional facility.199
In this case, the interest of the state's prison security outweighed Harper's liberty interest
to refuse unwanted medication. 200
While the right to make one's own medical decisions is not absolute, the Court in
Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Department of Health20 1 found that competent
individuals have a liberty interest to refuse medical care under the Fourteenth
Amendment.202 In Cruzan, Nancy Cruzan was severely injured in an automobile
accident.203 The accident left Cruzan brain-dead and artificial feeding and hydration
were keeping her physically alive.204 Cruzan's doctors believed she would never regain
any cognitive functioning, and her parents petitioned the court to allow the doctors to
remove the artificial apparatuses keeping her alive. 205 The trial court granted the parents'
request, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's decision. 2 06
The Missouri Supreme Court held that the Missouri Living Will statute207 favored
the "preservation of life"208 and required a showing of clear and convincing evidence
that the incompetent person would want to be removed from life support. 209 The Court
also held that a conversation with a friend, in which Cruzan had previously stated she
would not want to live if she could not live a relatively normal life, was not enough to
establish her intent by clear and convincing evidence.210 The Court concluded that
Cruzan's parents could not make the decision to terminate her life without the required
paperwork stating Cruzan's intent that would satisfy the Missouri statute. 2 1 1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether there
was a constitutional right to remove life support.212 The Cruzan Court described the
common law notion of bodily integrity, how physicians obtained informed consent for
medical treatments, and how people had a right to not consent to medical care.213 As
explained by the Cruzan Court, this case was the first to ask whether the United States
Constitution allowed the right to die.214 Other cases implied that the right to refuse
medical care as a liberty interest, but the right was not absolute.215 To determine whether
a state statute violated a person's constitutional right to refuse medical care, the Cruzan
Court used the Youngberg test to "balanc[e] [a person's] liberty interests against the

199. Id. at 222.
200. Id. at 225-227.
201. Chemerinsky, supra n. 32, at 906 (explaining that the Cruzan case is argued as "the most important
case ... concerning the right to refuse medical care. .
202. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
203. Id at 265.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 267.
206. Id. at 268.
207. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010 (1986).
208. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
209. Id. at 269.
210. Id at 268.
211. Id. at 268-269.
212. Id. at 269.
213. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269-270.
214. Id. at 277.
215. Id. at 279.
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relevant state interests."216 The Cruzan Court held that, generally, a "competent" 2 17
person would have the constitutional right to refuse medical care, as he or she could
make "an informed and voluntary choice" to exercise that right. 218 Under the facts of
this case, however, Cruzan was held to be incompetent and unable to make the choice as
to whether she wanted the life support machines removed. 219 Without clear and
convincing evidence of Cruzan's wishes to terminate her artificial life, the Court held
that her parents could not remove the life support. 2 20
As explained above, the Cruzan Court held that a competent person has a
constitutional right to make his or her own medical decisions as part of their liberty
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.221 Because this liberty interest is not absolute,
courts must use the Youngberg balancing test to determine whether a person's Due
Process rights have been infringed when he or she is not allowed to refuse medical
care.222 Various courts on the state and federal level have recognized legitimate interests
states may use in the balancing test.223 These exceptions to the general right to refuse
medical care include the "preservation of human life," 224 the perpetuation of the
"integrity and ethics of the medical profession,"225 the protection of innocent third
227
parties,226 and the prevention of suicide.
When applying the Youngberg balancing test to the ultrasound requirement, the
liberty interest at stake would be a pregnant woman's right to refuse a medically
unnecessary ultrasound being used solely to discourage her from exercising her
constitutional right to obtain an abortion.228 Oklahoma will likely argue that it has
legitimate state interests of preserving life, protecting innocent third parties, and
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession in a case questioning the
constitutionality of the ultrasound requirement.229 These legitimate state interests,
however, are not relevant to the ultrasound requirement, and the court should not use
them in its balancing test. 230
It is undeniable that states have the right to preserve human life.231 While this is an
exception to the general rule that a person has the right to refuse medical care, there is
little case law to suggest that this exception includes potential life.232 The District of
216. Id (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321).
217. Id at 279.
218. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279-280.
219. Id. at 280.
220. Id. at 286-287.
221. Id. at 279.
222. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
223. See e.g. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728-733 (1997); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill.
1989); In re Guardianshipof Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990).
224. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-731.
225. Id. at 731-733.
226. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
227. Id.
228. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279; State Policies in Brief,supran. 78.
229. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-732; Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
230. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
231. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-281; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-73 1.
232. For a discussion of instances and rationales of states' use of force to compel non-consensual medical
treatment on pregnant women, see April Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse
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Columbia Superior Court held in In re Madyun233 that a court could compel a woman to
have a caesarean section against her will in order to save a viable fetus because the state
had a compelling interest in preserving the life of the viable fetus.234 In this case,
Madyun's pregnancy was full-term and forty-eight hours prior to admittance to the
hospital, Madyun's water broke.235 Once Madyun's doctors determined that labor was
not progressing as it should, they sought consent to perform a caesarean section to
prevent harm to the viable fetus.236 Based on her religious beliefs, Madyun denied
consent for the caesarean section and stated that she wanted to deliver the fetus
naturally.237 At the court hearing to compel the physicians to perform the caesarean
section, the Madyun Court recognized the general right to refuse medical care, but that
the state had a compelling interest in preserving the fetus's life because it was full-term
and viable.238 The Madyun Court weighed the potential harm to the fetus against the
potential harm to the mother, and concluded the risk of harm to the fetus was significant,
while risk of harm to the mother was minimal. 239
On the other hand, four years later in In re A. C.,240 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals vehemently disagreed with the decision in Madyun.241 The A. C. Court agreed
with A.C.'s counsel that the decision in Madyun "was [an] error for the trial court to
weigh the state's interest in preserving the potential life of a viable fetus against"242 the
pregnant woman's right to refuse medical care. 243 The A. C. Court had to determine who
had the right to determine medical care for a woman pregnant with a viable fetus. 244
A.C., who had been battling cancer since the age of thirteen, complained to her doctor
about pain and shortness of breath. 24 5 When her doctor discovered an inoperable tumor
on her lung, the doctor discussed A.C.'s future and the future of her 26-week-old
fetus. 2 46
While death was imminent for A.C., the doctor informed her that if she would
consent to "palliative treatment," 2 47 there was a possibility of extending her life for two
more weeks in order to improve her fetus's chance of survival. 248 A.C. consented to this
course of action, but when her condition worsened, she was heavily sedated and unable
to communicate.249 Her physicians petitioned the court to order a caesarean section to be
Medical Treatment, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 563, 588-608 (2002).
233. In re A.C, 573 A.2d 1235, 1259-1264 (D.C. 1990) (Madyun opinion can be found in the appendix of In
re A.C.).
234. Id. at 1264.
235. Id. at 1260.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. AC., 573 A.2d at 1262.
239. Id. at 1264.
240. 573 A.2d 1235.
241. Id at 1252.
242. Id. at 1238.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1237.
245. AC., 573 A.2d at 1238.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1238-1239.
249. Id.
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performed, and the judge, relying heavily on Madyun, signed an order allowing the
caesarean section to be performed. 250 Both mother and child died within two days after
the caesarean section.251 The Court of Appeals heard this case, despite the deaths that
made the issue moot, because "collateral consequences [would] flow from any
decision"252 it rendered.253 In rejecting the holding in Madyun, the A. C Court held that
if a pregnant woman is competent, "her wishes will control in virtually all cases." 254
Thus, a state would be allowed to override a competent woman's right to refuse medical
care only in extraordinary situations.255
In Hughes v. State,2 56 the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals rejected the
common law "born alive"257 doctrine that gave the legal right to life to a fetus only after
it had been delivered and could live independently. 258 In this case, the defendant caused
an accident, while driving under the influence, in which the result of the impact caused
the driver of the second car to miscarry the full-term fetus she was carrying.259 In
rejecting the born alive doctrine, the Hughes Court adopted a new standard, holding that
a fetus is a person under the law once it becomes viable.260 This standard gave a viable
fetus the legal right to life, allowing the prosecution of persons causing the death of a
viable, yet unborn, fetus. 26 1
Because of the limited case law exploring the preservation of potential human life
exception, Oklahoma might attempt to use Madyun or similar cases as persuasive
authority to argue that the preservation of human life exception should be used in the
court's balancing test.262 A court should reject this argument and hold that the
preservation of human life exception would not be applicable to the ultrasound
requirement.263 First, the exception seeks to preserve human life; it does not mention the
preservation of potential life. 264 In addition, even if examined under the strict Madyun
standard, a standard which is no longer "good law"265 in its own jurisdiction, the
exception would fail to apply to the ultrasound requirement because in Madyun and
similar cases compelling non-consensual medical treatment, the fetuses were full-term
and viable.266 Customarily, cases that find a state's interest in preserving potential life
that override a woman's right to refuse medical treatment involve viable fetuses. 267
250. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238.
251. Id
252. Id at 1241.
253. Id
254. Id at 1252.
255. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
256. 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
257. Id. at 732.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 731.
260. Id. at 733.
261. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 733.
262. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-731.
263. Id
264. Id.
265. George J. Annas, At Law: Foreclosing the Use of Force: A.C. Reversed, 20 Hastings Ctr. Rpt. 27, 28
(July-Aug. 1990).
266. A.C., 573 A.2d at 1263-1264.
267. See e.g. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Co. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga. 1981).
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Similarly, Oklahoma gives a fetus the right to life only after viability. 268 The ultrasound
requirement applies only to non-viable fetuses because Oklahoma proscribes abortion
once a fetus becomes viable.269 The ultrasound requirement allows the state to override a
woman's right to refuse medical care on the chance that an ultrasound would preserve a
nonviable fetus. 270 This provision effectively allows the state to value the rights of a
nonviable fetus above those of a competent, adult woman. 27 1
The second exception arguably applicable to the ultrasound requirement is the
protection of innocent third parties.272 Applying this exception to the abortion context
seems incompatible with a woman's constitutional right to obtain an abortion and is
directly contradictory to the law laid out in both Roe and Casey.2 73 If a court applied this
exception to the abortion context at all, it would essentially give the legislature a pass to
ban abortion as the unborn, viable or nonviable, are arguably the ultimate innocent third
parties.274 However, to apply this exception to the ultrasound requirement as a way for
Oklahoma to override a person's right to refuse medical care would be ludicrous because
an ultrasound, by its very nature, is not used as a life-protecting treatment but as a
diagnostic tool. 275 The state wants to use the ultrasound to discourage abortions, but an
ultrasound itself will not save the life of an innocent third party. 276
Typically, the exception for the protection of innocent third parties is limited.277
The protection of innocent third parties as an exception to the right to refuse medical care
is typically "limited to situations in which the interests of the patient's dependents may
be adversely affected"278 or instances of "epidemics and other major public health
problems." 2 79 In relation to the ultrasound requirement, the fetus has no legal right to life
until viability.280 Therefore, supporters of the ultrasound requirement could not logically
argue that a non-viable fetus is a dependent, if the law does not even legally recognize it
as a person.281 In addition, compelled nonconsensual medical treatment of pregnant
women is not "sufficiently public" for this exception to be relevant to the ultrasound
requirement.282
268. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 734.
269. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-732 (1999).
270. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b(B) (the provision requires ultrasounds to be performed prior to every
abortion, regardless of consent).
271. Id.; Casey permits state intervention on behalf of a nonviable fetus only if it does not establish an undue
burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. 505 U.S. at 877.
272. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731-733.
273. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (reasoning "[i]t is settled now ... that the Constitution places limits on a State's
right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood . . .").
274. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14; Gold, supra n. 108, at 20 (describing the narrative in the film The Silent
Scream, "the image of the fetus as having its 'mouth wide open in ... the silent scream of a child threatened
imminently with extinction' ").
275. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129 (explaining that an ultrasound is used as a diagnostic tool).
276. Id.
277. Amanda Moore & Hunter Tzovarras, 2005-2006 National Health Law Moot Court Competition: Best
Brief,27 J. Leg. Med. 395, 415 (Dec. 2006).
278. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D.R.I. 1988) (quoting Tune v. Walter Reed Army Med. Hosp.,
602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 at n. 8 (D.D.C. 1985)).
279. Cherry, supra n. 232, at 592, n. 164.
280. Hughes, 868 P.2d at 734.
281. Id.
282. Cherry, supra n. 232, at 592, n. 164.
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Finally, protecting the ethics and integrity of the medical profession is a legitimate
state interest in restricting the right to refuse medical care.283 In the application of the
ultrasound requirement, the provision appears to go directly against the interest of
protecting the integrity of the medical profession.284 During their training as doctors and
nurses, these individuals are taught that touching a patient without his or her consent
constitutes battery.285 Therefore, prior to any medical procedure or treatment, a
physician must know that his or her patient consents to the treatment.286 The law
requiring a physician to perform an ultrasound-a medical procedure-while the patient is
saying "no" would constitute a battery at common law.287 This leaves the physician with
one of two options: force an ultrasound on a nonconsenting patient, as required by law,
and commit a battery against his or her patient, or not perform the ultrasound and risk a
fine of $10,000 for the physician's first offense, $50,000 for the second offense, and
$100,000 for the third.288 The ultrasound requirement creates an ethical dilemma for
physicians.289 In essence, rather than promoting ethical integrity in the medical
profession by restricting the right to refuse medical care, the state is hindering the
integrity. 290 Therefore, the state's interest in promoting ethical integrity in the medical
profession should not be used, in this instance, in the Youngberg balancing test. 29 1
The ultrasound requirement compels either a vaginal ultrasound or an abdominal
ultrasound, whichever depicts the fetus more clearly.292 During the first trimester,
physicians rarely use abdominal ultrasounds, as they do not allow a clear depiction of the
fetus; therefore, physicians most commonly use vaginal ultrasounds during this
period.293 Vaginal ultrasounds are commonly used in obstetric and gynecological care
and can be used to diagnose many early pregnancy or gynecological problems.294 A
physician performs a vaginal ultrasound using a transducer, roughly the size of a
speculum, which is covered with a condom and inserted as far into the vagina as
possible. 295 First trimester abortions account for eighty-nine percent of the abortions
performed in the United States.296 Using this logic, the Oklahoma legislature is
mandating that most women seeking an abortion have a medical instrument inserted into
their vagina, with or without their consent.297
Supporters of the ultrasound requirement might claim that any abortion requires
medical instruments inserted into the vagina, so a vaginal ultrasound could not be any
283. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731; Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
284. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731; Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
285. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129.
286. Id
287. Id.
288. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3c(C).
289. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
290. Id.
291. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.
292. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b(B)(1).
293. Telephone Interview, Stone, supran. 129.
294. Id.
295. Id
296. Guttmacher Institute, Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States 2, http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/fb induced abortion.pdf (accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
297. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129.
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more invasive than the abortion itself.298 This argument is fatally flawed due to the lack
of consent. 299 Consent is the backbone of the medical profession in the United States,
and requiring a physician to insert a medical instrument into a woman's vagina, while
she adamantly refuses, strips her of her bodily integrity.300
Furthermore, while supporters of the ultrasound requirements might argue that
ultrasounds are harmless medical procedures, the FDA has warned against ultrasounds
when not medically necessary. 30 1 Specifically, the FDA warns that because the effects of
an ultrasound are not completely understood, "having a prenatal ultrasound for nonmedical reasons is not a good idea."302 While ultrasounds generally are considered safe
at low levels, the procedure involves energy in the form of high-frequency sound waves
that can have physical effects on human tissue. 303 The effects of ultrasounds on the
development of fetuses are not fully understood, especially since the "embryonic period
is known to be particularly sensitive to any external influences." 304 The entire purpose
behind requiring a woman to have an ultrasound prior to an abortion is to discourage her
from having an abortion.305 If the tactic succeeds, the effect of a medically unnecessary
ultrasound could be harmful to the fetus. 306 While research in this area is particularly
difficult, some doctors believe that exposure to ultrasounds could affect the fetus's
development.307 Therefore, if the state's purpose of abortion discouragement were
satisfied, the state would be gambling with a fetus's development by requiring a
medically unnecessary ultrasound. 308
As explained in Cruzan, a competent person has a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment in the right to refuse medical care,309 but that interest must be
balanced with the state's interest.3o In the case of the ultrasound requirement, the
woman's liberty right that is invoked is the right to refuse a medically unnecessary
ultrasound. 31 1 The woman may not have the means to pay for an unnecessary test that
would increase the cost of an abortion by approximately fifty percent,312 or perhaps the
woman is a victim of a rape or incest and may not want to add even more trauma to an
already excruciating decision. 3 13 Alternatively, perhaps a woman would rather remain

298. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000) (explaining that most first trimester abortions are
performed using vacuum aspiration where a tube is inserted into the uterus through the vagina to vacuum out
the contents of the uterus).
299. Telephone Interview, Stone, supran. 129.
300. Id. (explaining that if a doctor touches a patient without his or her consent, he or she has committed a
battery).
301. Carol Rados, US. Food and Drug Administration, "FDA Cautions Against Ultrasound 'Keepsake'
Images," http://www.sdms.orglpdf/FDAKeepsake.pdf (accessed Mar. 17, 2010).
302. Id.
303. Id
304. Id
305. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
306. Rados, supra n. 301.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
310. Id. (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321).
311. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129; Valpey, supra n. 129, at 2.
312. Valpey, supran. 129, at 2.
313. Gov. Henry, supra n. 74.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/7

22

Weber: An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newes
2009

ANATTEMPT TO LEGISLATE MORALITY

38 1

unaware of the more difficult details of the abortion than what she deems necessary.314
Any reason that a competent, adult woman used to refuse an ultrasound prior to an
abortion of a non-viable fetus would outweigh a state's interest in preserving a nonviable fetus. 3 15 Therefore, the ultrasound requirement, unquestionably, should be
declared unconstitutional, as it denies a woman's liberty interest in the right to refuse
medical care.316
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the right to an abortion is not absolute, a woman has a constitutional
right to obtain an abortion.317 To determine whether a statute infringes on the right to an
abortion, the undue burden standard is utilized.318 A statute is an undue burden on a
woman's right to obtain an abortion if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in [her] path" 3 19 The ultrasound requirement has both the "purpose
[and] effect of placing a substantial obstacle" 320 before a woman's right to an
abortion. 32 1 The supporters of the bill argue that its purpose is to inform women of the
choice they are about to make and to aid in the psychological well-being of women
unsure about the abortion decision. 322
Oklahoma already had a comprehensive informed consent statute that required
physicians to advocate the state's preference in choosing life over abortion.323 Allowing
the legislature to require a medically unnecessary test to guilt and shame a woman into
childbirth is blatantly unconstitutional and a shameful move by the legislature.324 The
ultrasound requirement does not merely advocate a state's preference for life over
abortion;325 it seeks to punish women economically and psychologically for exercising
their right to a valid medical procedure.326 The legislature has taken a valid medical
requirement-informed consent-and molded it into a tool that severely limits a woman's
constitutional right to seek an abortion.327
An ultrasound is a medical procedure.328 Consent is required for any doctor to
perform a medical procedure on another human being.329 By requiring a physician to
perform a medical procedure on all pregnant women seeking an abortion, the Oklahoma
legislature blatantly disregards the purported purpose of informed consent. 3 30 Oklahoma
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 160.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
Id at 874.
Id at 877.
Id
Id
Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78.
Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 1-738.2.
Van Detta, supran. 1, at 259.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
Van Detta, supran. 1, at 259.
Id.
Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129.
Id.; Fry-Revere, supra n. 150.
Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129; Dana Stone, Oklahoma's Anti-Abortion Bill a Set-Back for
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is requiring most women seeking an abortion to have a transducer inserted into their
vagina, with or without their consent. 33 1 This law is the "antithesis of informed
consent." 332
Requiring an ultrasound prior to every abortion is a psychological, "substantial
obstacle" 333 to a woman's right to choose an abortion. 334 The Oklahoma legislature is
attempting to use a medically unnecessary ultrasound to psychologically guilt a woman
into carrying a child she did not intend to have. 335 The law was passed in the hope that
once a woman saw an ultrasound image of the fetus and heard her physician explaining
its physical characteristics, she would forget the reasons she wanted the abortion and
make an emotional decision to carry the fetus to term. 336 It is conceded that some
women regret having an abortion, that perhaps a required ultrasound would have
changed their mind regarding the abortion, and that the ultrasound requirement would
have encouraged their psychological well-being. 337 The ultrasound requirement,
however, could potentially harm the psychological well-being of even larger groups of
women: those who see the ultrasound image and proceed with the abortion and those
who see the ultrasound image, cancel the abortion, and have a child they cannot
physically, emotionally, mentally, or economically care for. 338
While informed consent and protecting a person's psychological well-being might
be legitimate state interests, neither is a legitimate purpose for the ultrasound
requirement.339 The only purpose remaining for the enactment of the ultrasound
provision is to discourage women from having abortions. 34 0 A law that "serve[s] no
purpose other than to make abortions more difficult" 34 1 should be declared
unconstitutional.342 A state should not be allowed to "further its interests [in protecting
potential life] by simply wearing down the ability of the pregnant woman to exercise her
constitutional right." 34 3 Abortion is a legal and constitutional medical procedure for a
pregnant woman, and such women should not be forced to jump through unnecessary

Both Pro-Choice and Pro-Life Advocates, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-dana-stone/oklahomas-antiabortion-b b 97672.html (accessed Mar. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Stone, Oklahoma Bill].
331. Stone, Oklahoma Bill, supra n. 330; See supra pt. III(B) explaining how most abortions are performed
in the first trimester and how vaginal ultrasounds are used during this period, as abdominal ultrasounds rarely
give a clear picture early in the pregnancy.
332. Thornburgh v. Am. College of Obstetricians& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 764 (1986); Fry-Revere,
supra n. 150 (explaining that "[fjorcing a woman to have and watch a medically unnecessary ultrasound is an
unsettling distortion of the informed consent process, eerily reminiscent of that haunting scene in A Clockwork
Orange, in which the protagonist's eyes are forcibly propped open as he is shown images intended to
recondition his behavior").
333. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
334. Id.
335. Van Detta, supra n. 1, at 259.
336. Hopkins et al, supra n. 135, at 553.
337. Id. at 544.
338. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
339. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-882.
340. Telephone Interview, Lamb, supra n. 78 (explaining a purpose of the ultrasound requirement is to
discourage women from aborting their babies).
341. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
342. Id. at 877 (explaining that if a law "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus," it is an undue burden and unconstitutional).
343. Id. at 918 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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and arbitrary legal hoops in order to obtain such a medical procedure. 344
Not only is the ultrasound requirement an undue burden on women seeking an
abortion, it is also contrary to the notion that a competent person has the right to refuse
medical care. 345 While lower courts have often held four exceptions to this general rulepreservation of human life, protection of innocent third parties, prevention of suicide,
and protection of the ethical integrity of the medical profession-none of the exceptions
should apply to the ultrasound requirement.346 Oklahoma is weighing the rights of a
nonviable fetus over the rights of a competent, adult woman. 347 Not only does this
ultrasound requirement allow the state to require a medically unnecessary test to
brazenly shame and guilt a woman into changing her mind, but it also strips her of her
bodily integrity. 34 8
Finally, the ultrasound requirement questions a woman's mental capacity.349
Oklahoma has enacted this law with the presumption that after the woman sees the
ultrasound image, she will realize that termination of the pregnancy is morally wrong. 350
However, as the plurality explained in Casey, "[the Court's] obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code." 3 51 Oklahoma is attempting to
mandate its own moral code and is unduly burdening a pregnant woman's ability to
obtain an abortion.352 Through the addition of an exorbitant increase in the cost of an
abortion for a medically unnecessary ultrasound, the potential psychological impacts and
physical battery, 353 and the overriding of a competent woman's right to refuse medical
care,354 Oklahoma places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion. 3 55 Therefore,
the ultrasound
requirement
should be
declared
unconstitutional. 356
Sarah E. Weber

344. Van Detta, supra n. 1, at 259.
345. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
346. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-733; Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
347. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321.
348. Van Detta, supra n. 1, at 259.
349. Casey, 505 U.S. at 918 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the mandatory waiting periods
"[appear] to rest on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of women").
350. Id. at 919 (describing how the waiting period "requirement may be premised on the belief that the
decision to terminate a pregnancy is presumptively wrong. This premise is illegitimate").
351. Id. at 850.
352. Id. at 877.
353. Telephone Interview, Stone, supra n. 129; Valpey, supran. 129, at 2.
354. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
355. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
356. Id
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